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ABSTRACT 
This Comment explores the implications SNS postings have on private 
employers concerning the off-duty, non-work related conduct of their employees.  
This argument recognizes that an employee is entitled to engage in whatever legal 
off-duty conduct he chooses, so long as the behavior does not damage his 
employer’s legitimate business interests.  An employer should not be able to use 
information gleaned from an employee’s SNS postings, unrelated to an employer’s 
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business interests, to punish an employee her choices outside the work place.  
Disciplining or terminating an employee for his off-duty lifestyle choices permits 
the morals and standards of the employer to control the employee’s personal life.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine an eighteen-year-old woman out on the town for a night of revelry.  
Imagine that said young woman poses for photographs with a passed-out young 
man, his body festooned with drawings of swastikas and phallic symbols.  Then, 
the photographs are posted to a website for all of her friends to see.  No big deal, 
chalk it up to youthful indiscretion?  The sort of activity that a person is not fired 
for, right?  Wrong.  The New England Patriots (“Patriots”), an NFL team, fired 
eighteen-year-old cheerleader, Caitlin Davis, for being in such photographs on the 
website Facebook.1  In the photographs, Davis leaned over an unconscious male, 
his face covered with drawings of phallic symbols, swastikas, and offensive 
statements.2  The photographs bounced from Facebook, to onblastatlast.com, to 
deadspin.com.3  Despite her protests that the photographs were “taken out of 
context” and that she did not draw on the individual,4 the New England Patriots 
fired Caitlin Davis.5 
The Internet is littered with the tales of those people fired over the content of 
their social networking sites profiles.6  Social networking sites (“SNS”) and social 
media7 are websites that “allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public 
profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they 
share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those 
made by others within the system.”8  Facebook boasts over eight hundred million 
active users.9  Approximately 50% of all active users log onto the website daily.10  
Every minute, YouTube users upload 48 hours of streaming video onto the 
                                                            
1 Catharine Smith & Craig Kanalley, Fired over Facebook: 13 Posts That Got People CANNED, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 26, 2010, 11:40 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/26/fired-over-
facebook posts_n_659170. html#s17699&title=NFL_Cheerleader_Fired.   
 Facebook is a social networking website.  For a definition of “social networking websites”, see infra 
text accompanying note 7.  
2 Id. 
3 Sarah F. Sullivan, New England Patriots Cheerleader Caitlin Davis Fired over Facebook 
Pictures, YAHOO! VOICES (Nov. 5, 2008), http://voices.yahoo.com/new-england-patriots-cheerleader-
caitlin-davis-fired-2161126.html. 
4 Id. 
5 Smith & Kanalley, supra note 1. 
6 See id.  Those fired for their Facebook postings are said to be “Facebook fired.”  Keith R. Crosley, 
Dooced, Twerminated, Facebook Fired: Lingo and Facts about Social Media and Employee 
Terminations, PROOFPOINT (Sep. 2, 2009), http://blog.proofpoint.com/2009/09/dooced-twerminated-
facebook-fired-lingo-and-facts-about-social-media-and-employee-terminations.html. 
7 For purposes of this article, “social networking sites” will refer to both social networking and 
social media websites. 
8 Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional Boundaries, 31 
PACE L. REV. 228, 237 (2011) (quoting Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: 
Definition, History, and Scholarship, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (Oct. 2007), http://jcmc.indiana. 
edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html). 
9 Facebook, Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Nov. 
8, 2011). 
10 Id. 
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website.11  Twitter, the micro-blogging website, has 100 million users.12   
To participate in an SNS, a user creates a profile and interacts with other 
users by posting messages to profiles, posting photographs and videos, and 
creating status updates.13  A post’s content takes many forms, like musings on 
traffic or a link to a particular website.  Just as the Supreme Court predicted in City 
of Ontario v. Quon, SNSs are now a “necessary instrument[] for self-expression, 
[and] self-identification.”14  
While a user’s postings are published to a profile, access to a profile is not 
carte blanche; each SNS offers privacy settings wherein a user can limit her 
profile’s accessibility.  For example, a Twitter user can “protect [her] tweets” so 
they are only seen by a user’s followers and her tweets are not available to the 
public.15  Similarly, Facebook allows a user to set a default privacy level of 
“public,” “friends,” or “custom.”16  Facebook even permits a user further 
customization by allowing her to choose, for example, who can post on her wall, or 
who can view her photographs.17  The existence of privacy settings exemplifies the 
inherent tension between the “human desire to share information with others” and 
the desire to “maintain[] one’s privacy.”18  SNSs are causing formerly disparate 
social contexts, like employment and off-duty conduct, to collapse into one.19  
With SNS use a dominant aspect of everyday life,20 “[i]nformation sharing on the 
web has reshaped our expectations of privacy,”21 particularly within the sphere of 
employment law.22   
                                                            
11 YouTube, Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://youtube.com/t/press_statistics (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).  
This statistic is from 2010.  Id.  Over 800 million “unique users” visit YouTube monthly.  Id.  
12 One Hundred Million Voice, TWITTER BLOG (Sep. 8, 2011), http://blog.twitter.com/2011/09/one-
hundred-million-voices.html. 
13 See Company Overview, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2012).  
14 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).   
15 Account, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/settings/account (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
16 Privacy Settings, FACEBOOK, http://facebook.com/settings/?tab=privacy (last visited Jan. 6, 
2012).   
17 Id.  However, these privacy settings frequently change without notice, so a user should be 
vigilant in checking his privacy settings to ensure it reflects his wishes. 
18 DOUGLAS DEXTER, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES IN THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: NEW ISSUES FOR 
EMPLOYERS 2 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
labor_law/meetings/2011/annualmeeting/028.authcheckdam.pdf. 
19 Danah Boyd, Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck: Exposure, Invasion, and Social Convergence, 
14(1) CONVERGENCE: THE INT’L J. RES. INTO NEW MEDIA TECHS. 13, 18 (2008), available at 
http://www.danah.org/papers/FacebookPrivacyTrainwreck.pdf. 
20 See Statistics, supra note 9. 
21 DEXTER, supra note 18, at 28. 
22 Jean M. Roche, Note, Why Can’t We Be Friends?: Why California Needs a Lifestyle 
Discrimination Statute to Protect Employees From Employment Actions Based on Their Off-Duty 
Behavior, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 187, 187 (2011). 
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Presently, employers use information gleaned from online searches in their 
hiring decisions.23  An employer can monitor his employees at-work Internet 
usage, so long as the practice is publicized and known to employees.24  Namely, an 
employer is entitled to read an employee’s emails and check an employee’s 
Internet activity.25 
There are concerns about the type of information an employee can reveal in 
her SNS postings, intentionally or unintentionally—“risks that employees may 
reveal trade secrets, harass their co-workers, criticize their supervisors, or simply 
discuss politically—or, morally—charged topics in a manner that may be linked 
with the company.”26  Because an employer has a financial interest in his 
business’s reputation, an employer is entitled to protect his business’s reputation as 
a legitimate business interest.27  Furthermore, as “personal reputation is 
increasingly influenced by what others know about us online,”28 it is 
understandable that an employer may want to monitor his employees’ SNS 
profiles.  An employer can enact a SNS policy to mitigate or eliminate the risks 
associated with an employee’s SNS profile.29  Therefore, since an employer has a 
                                                            
23 Id. at 189.  However, online searches should be restricted to job-related information.  William C. 
Martucci et al., Hiring and Firing in the Facebook Age (With Sample Provisions), PRAC. LAW., Oct. 
2010, at 19, 21.  Accordingly, “[s]hould an employer use information found via an online search to 
disqualify an applicant, an employer must be able to articulate a job-related rationale for the 
disqualification.  If the information is not related to the job at stake, or the employer can articulate no 
such rationale,” the employer is “vulnerable” to a discrimination claim.  Id. 
24 Id.  For example, an employee has no expectation of privacy in emails sent over the employer’s 
email system when the employer maintains a practice of monitoring computer usage, the employer has 
informed an employee that she has no reasonable expectation of privacy in company emails, and the 
employee clicked a privacy warning in order to access the employer’s computer system.  Roche, supra 
note 22, at 189 n. 15.  In some states, an employer is required to give notice to his employees prior to 
monitoring his employee’s email communications and Internet activity.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31–
48d(b)(1) (1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b)(1)–(2) (2002). 
25 Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, Employee’s Privacy Rights in Social 
Networking Web Site Postings: Are Facebook Firings Legal?, 23 NO. 11 EMP L. UPDATE 1, 1 (Nov. 
2009) [hereinafter Rutkowski & Rutkowski, Employee’s Privacy Rights]; see also Fact Sheet 7: 
Workplace Privacy and Employee Monitoring, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (last updated Jan. 
2012), http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs7-work.htm (“If an electronic mail (e-mail) system is used at a 
company, the employer owns it and is allowed to review its contents.”). 
26 Martucci, supra note 23, at 20. 
27 Roche, supra note 22, at 189.  For a definition of “legitimate business interests”, please see 
discussion infra Part IV.B. 
28 Id. (quoting Harry A. Valetk, Off the Clock: Should Your Personal Online Chronicles Jeopardize 
Your Career?, LAW.COM (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=120213623 
1178.). 
29 Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, Social Media Policies: Should Your Company 
Adopt One? Consider the Issues; View the Sample Policy to Decide, 24 No. 11 EMP. L. UPDATE 1, 9 
(Nov. 2010) [hereinafter Rutkowski & Rutkowski, Social Media Policies].  See id. and Martucci, supra 
note 23, at 25–26.  This Comment will not analyze said policies. 
 In City of Ontario v. Quon, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “employer policies 
concerning communications” are what “shape the reasonable expectations of their employees, 
especially to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated.”  130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).  
The case asked whether a city employee, Quon, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text 
messages on his government-issued pager.  Id. at 2622.  While the Court held that Quon did have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, the Court refused to decide whether an 
employee always had a reasonable expectation of privacy in employer-provided technology.  Id. at 
2630.  
 However, the Supreme Court’s aversion to decide cases involving emerging technologies is eroding, 
as evidenced by the Court’s landmark decision in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  The 
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legitimate business interest in her company’s reputation, it is unreasonable to 
completely forbid an employer from perusing her employees’ SNS profiles.   
However, much online behavior “does not directly affect the business 
interests of the employer, and thus, should not be used against the employee” in an 
employer’s employment decisions.30  The topic of SNS posts can be of a more 
controversial nature—comments, photographs, or posts can reveal that an 
employee participates in risky behavior, like skydiving, or that she is involved in a 
homosexual relationship.  Although the above examples do not overtly implicate 
an employer’s business interests, an employer can legally terminate an employee 
for such behavior.31  Generally, the employment at-will doctrine allows an 
employer to “take action against [an employee]” for her SNS profile’s content.32  
Consequently, an employer can base an adverse employment decision on the fact 
that he disagrees with an employee’s lifestyle choices.33  
Although an employee waives some of her privacy rights to an employer 
upon accepting employment,34 courts or legislatures should recognize the 
difference between an employee waiving some of her privacy rights in the 
workplace versus having an employer’s influence an employee’s off-duty, non-
work related decision out of fear of an adverse employment decision. 
The above examples show that employers are disciplining employees for off-
duty conduct as in SNS postings.35  Further complicating the matter is the fact that 
employees consider their SNS profiles private.36  Employer and employee attitudes 
towards social networking are not merely divergent, but completely antagonistic.  
According to a 2009 study by Deloitte, LLP, 53% of employees believe their SNS 
                                                            
Court held that the government violated Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights when it attached a global 
positioning service (“GPS”) device to his vehicle to track its movements.  According to the Court, 
“[t]he [g]overnment physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information” 
when attaching a GPS device to Jones’s car parked in his driveway.  Id. at 949.  The Court did not 
decide if Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy, because the Fourth Amendment rights in 
question did not “rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”  Id. at 947; see supra text accompanying note 
40.  The Jones decision suggests that the Court is willing to apply Constitutional principles to emerging 
technologies, which is in marked contrast to how the Court shied away from doing just that in Quon.  
Compare id. at 945, with Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.  By deciding that a technological device can invade 
a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court validates the present reality that technology is 
an omnipresent part of everyday life.  Furthermore, there is reason to hope that the Supreme Court’s 
Jones decision will influence lower courts to adopt a more liberal view of technology and its place in 
everyday life. 
30 Roche, supra note 22, at 190 (emphasis added).  
31 See infra text accompanying note 32.  
32 The at-will employment doctrine allows an employer to fire an employee for any reason.  
Martucci, supra note 23, at 22.  Forty-nine states presume employment is at-will.  Joseph Lipps, State 
Lifestyle Statutes and the Blogosphere: Autonomy for Private Employees in the Internet Age, 72 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 645, 649 (2010).  Montana is the only state that does not presume at-will employment.  Id. 
33 See supra text accompanying note 32.  
34 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
35 Martucci, supra note 23, at 22. 
36 DELOITTE LLP 2009 ETHICS AND WORKPLACE SURVEY AND RESULTS, SOCIAL NETWORKING 
AND REPUTATIONAL RISK IN THE WORKPLACE 6 (2009), available at http://www.deloitte.com/ 
assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_2009_ethics_workplace_survey_220509.pdf.  
Opinion Research Corporation conducted a telephone survey for Deloitte LLP.  Id. at 15.  They 
surveyed a national probability sample of 2,008 employed adults aged eighteen and older living in 
private households.  Id.  Opinion Research Corporation also surveyed 500 business executives via an 
online survey.  Id. 
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are “none of their employer’s business.”37  However, 40% of executives disagree.38  
30% of executives admitted to informally monitoring their employee’s SNS profile 
postings.39  The chasm between employer and employee perception of SNS 
profiles is wide, and without some sort of resolution—either judicially or 
legislatively—litigation is inevitable.  Both legislatures and courts are resistant to 
change the employment laws to recognize that an employee’s participation with 
SNS warrants protection from adverse employment decisions.  Instead of forcing 
an employee to risk her livelihood when she participates in a socially acceptable 
form of interaction, the law should accept the reasonableness of such interaction by 
protecting it.  SNS are part of the social culture, and the law should recognize this 
reality.40 
This Comment explores the implications SNS postings have on private 
employers concerning the off-duty, non-work related conduct of their employees.  
This argument recognizes that an employee is entitled to engage in whatever legal 
off-duty conduct he chooses, so long as the behavior does not damage his 
employer’s legitimate business interests.  An employer should not be able to use 
information gleaned from an employee’s SNS postings, unrelated to an employer’s 
business interests, to punish an employee her choices outside the work place.  
Disciplining or terminating an employee for his off-duty lifestyle choices permits 
the morals and standards of the employer to control the employee’s personal life.   
Part I introduced the general landscape of SNS policies and employment 
environment.  Part II provides a background of the various causes of action 
available to an employee to protest an employer’s employment decision, as well as 
examining the applicability of such claims to the regulation of an employee’s off-
duty conduct.  Section A discusses the United States Constitution’s protection for 
free speech and against unlawful searches and seizures.  Section B examines how 
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has applied the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”) to cases wherein an employee was terminated for her 
SNS postings.  Section C addresses the parameters of state off-duty conduct 
statutes.  Section D gives an overview of the common law right to privacy.  Part III 
analyzes the recent cases and holdings that involve SNS.  Part IV further analyzes 
how these holdings apply in Caitlin Davis’s situation to illustrate the consequences 
of limitless employer discretion.  Section B offers a definition for legitimate 
business interests to be applied to SNS employment cases to determine if an 
employee’s post-employment affairs affect her employer’s legitimate business 
interests.  Part V asserts why it is imperative that governments or legal bodies—at 
                                                            
37 Id. at 6. 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  Even if employers are monitoring SNS pages, 61% of employees stated they would not 
change their online activities, and that they would adjust their SNS profile content.  Id.  Even more 
telling is that 27% of employees surveyed stated that they “don’t consider the ethical consequences of 
posting comments, photos, or videos online—and more than one-third don’t consider their boss, their 
colleagues, or their clients.”  Id. at 8.  This survey suggests that employees consider their SNS postings 
to be their own personal space, divorced from their jobs, its responsibilities, and their SNS profile’s 
impact on their employer’s business interests.  In light of such attitudes, it is clear that an employer is 
entitled to monitor an employee’s SNS profile for things like trade secrets reveals and the like.  See 
Martucci, supra note 23, at 20. 
40 Emily H. Fulmer, Privacy Expectations and Protections for Teachers in the Internet Age, 2010 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14, ¶ 62 (2010).  
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either the state or federal level—draw the line between an employer’s legitimate 
business interests and an employee’s freedom to structure her free time. 
II.  POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION 
An employee can use some causes of actions to combat her employer’s 
unjust employment action.  Between the United States Constitution, the NLRA, 
state statutes, and privacy causes of action, a plethora of options are available to an 
employee.  Unfortunately, judicial action severely limits these causes of action for 
a private employee.   
A.  United States Constitution  
Forty-two U.S.C. section 1983 confers a cause of action to a person whose 
constitutional rights are violated by the government or its actors.41  Governmental 
and public employees can avail themselves to the federal constitutional rights of 
free speech and privacy, guaranteed by the First42 and Fourth Amendments,43 
respectively.44  An employee is not protected by the Constitution against an 
employers adverse employment decisions.45  
1.  First Amendment 
At first blush, the First Amendment appears to be an ideal cause of action for 
a government employee to levy against her employer.46  However, the Supreme 
Court has limited the First Amendment’s application, qualifying which types of 
speech garner protection.47  For a successful First Amendment claim, an employee 
                                                            
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).   
42 The First Amendment protects a person’s freedom of speech.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
“Speech” means the “constitutionally protected interest in [the] freedom of expression.”  See Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967)). 
43 The Fourth Amendment protects an individual from the invasion of the government’s 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 516 (4th ed. 2011) (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).  Not 
every act is “private” for Fourth Amendment purposes.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”).  Courts apply Justice John Marshall 
Harlan’s reasonableness standard to determine if a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy: first, 
the individual must have manifested “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and, secondly, 
society is “prepared to recognize” this expectation as reasonable.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see 
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 742–43 (1979) (holding that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers one dials, nor does society recognize such a privacy 
expectation).  
44 Both state and federal governments are bound by the Constitution.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 43, at 518 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1961)) (“[T]he prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment . . . are all to be enforced against the States under the 
Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against 
federal encroachment.”). 
45 See § 1983. 
46 Kelly Schoening & Kelli Kleisinger, Off–Duty Privacy: How Far Can Employers Go?, 37 N. 
KY. L. REV.  287, 305 (2010). 
47 See Lipps, supra note 32, at 648–49. 
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must speak out “on a matter of ‘public concern.’”48  Thus, a police department 
does not violate the First Amendment when it terminates a police officer for 
operating and starring in a pornographic website.49  Although public employees are 
free to run pornographic websites for a profit, they are not free to participate and 
“avoid [government] discipline at the same time.”50  A public employee “has 
greater protection if [she] discusses a matter of public concern.”51  If courts can 
limit the seemingly broad protection of the Constitution, then it is of no surprise 
that courts give private employers broad discretion to make employment decisions. 
2.  Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects a public employee from her employer’s 
unreasonable searches and seizures.52  First, a court determines if the employee 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and secondly, the court determines 
whether the search was reasonable in its scope.53  The court balances the 
employee’s invasion of privacy against the government’s need for control in the 
workplace.54  Within the context of SNS, a government employer can implement 
an electronic communication policy to destroy an employee’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy so as to insulate themselves against Fourth Amendment 
claims.55 
                                                            
48 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
568 (1968)).  The First Amendment’s “primary aim is the full protection of speech upon issues of 
public concern.”  Id. at 154.  “Public concern” is a matter “concerning government policies that are of 
interest to the pubic at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely qualified to comment.”  
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 138).   
 If an employee is “speak[ing] or writ[ing] on their own time on topics unrelated to their 
employment, the speech can have First Amendment protection, absent some governmental justification 
‘far stronger than mere speculation’ in regulating it.”  Roe, 543 U.S. at 80 (quoting U.S. v. Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995)). 
 When an employee claims that her governmental employer violated her First Amendment right, a 
court engages in two separate inquiries to determine if the employee’s conduct was related or unrelated 
to her public employment.  Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir. 2007).  If the 
employer’s speech was related, the court balances the employee’s interests “as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [government], as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”  Id. at 927 (quoting Roe, 543 U.S. 
at 82).  If the employee’s speech was unrelated, the court still uses a balancing test.  Id.  Although the 
Supreme Court has not dictated a clear balancing test, the Ninth Circuit balanced “the asserted First 
Amendment right against the government’s justification.”  Id. 
49 Dible, 515 F.3d at 922–23.  The police department terminated Dible for violating the 
department’s rules forbidding outside employment and disreputable conduct.  Id. at 926.  
 The Dibles also argued that the city violated their First Amendment rights to privacy and freedom of 
association.  Id. at 929.  The Ninth Circuit recognized that the First Amendment includes a right to 
privacy in the “right to make personal decisions and a right to keep personal matters private.”  Id. 
(citing Germ v. U.S. Trustee (In Re Crawford), 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999)).  However, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the Dibles’s claim as “virtually oxymoron[ic].”  Id. at 930.  Without evidence that the 
City publicized the Dibles’s connection to the Dibles’s pornographic website, the City did not invade 
the Dibles’s right to privacy.  Id.  
50 Id. at 930. 
51 Schoening & Kleisinger, supra note 46, at 306. 
52 Id. at 307.  
53 Id. 
54 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719–20 (1987).  
55 Schoening & Kleisinger, supra note 46, at 309.  
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These protections do not extend to private employees.56  Because 
employment is at-will in forty-nine states,57 private employees are less protected 
against an employer’s arbitrary employment decisions than a public employee.  
Thus, an employee may resort to a statutory scheme for their cause of action. 
B.  NLRB and NLRA 
Recently, the NLRB grappled with the difficult question of how much to 
protect an employee’s SNS postings criticized her employer.58  The NLRA59 
applies to both public and private employees, regardless of whether they are 
unionized.60  Specifically, the Act protects an employee’s rights to unionize, 
collectively bargain, and participate in concerted activity.61  When an employer 
terminates an employee for work-related SNS posts, the employer’s activity may 
be activity in violation of the NLRA. 
Cases fall under two categories: first, cases that challenge an employer’s 
SNS policies as overbroad,62 and secondly, cases that challenge an employer’s 
adverse employment decision based upon an employee’s SNS posts.63  The NLRB 
applies a two-part test to determine if an employee’s SNS post is protected under 
                                                            
56 Rutkowski & Rutkowski, Employee’s Privacy Rights, supra note 25, at 2. 
 Public employees have had little success in claiming that they have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their SNS posts.  In particular, the SNS profiles of public school teachers have led to firings, 
and as a consequence, litigation.  See generally Fulmer, supra note 40 (advocating that the law 
guarantee teachers “special protection” against “professional discipline” for legal, private conduct in 
their SNS posts).  However, in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012), the Court did not shy away from deciding how the Constitution’s rights apply to an emerging 
technology; see supra text accompanying note 29. 
57 See supra text accompanying note 24.  
58 See generally OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., OM 11–74, REPORT OF 
THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011) [hereinafter REPORT OF 
THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL] (discussing recent case developments within context of SNS).  Since 
many of cases are in the early stages of litigation, surveys of the cases and issues are to “assist 
employers and counsel [to] identify issues with which they should [employers and counsel] be aware 
[of] as they grapple with the application of labor law to employee use of social media.”  MICHAEL J. 
EASTMAN, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES BEFORE THE NLRB, 1 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
2011), [hereinafter SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES], available at http://www.uschamber.com/ 
sites/default/files/reports/NLRB%20Social%20Media%20Survey%20-%20FINAL.pdf.   For a complete 
summary of the cases, issues, and applicable statutes involved, see generally SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
ISSUES, at 9–34. 
59 See National Labor Relations Act §§ 1–1129 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006).  
60 Schoening & Kleisinger, supra note 46, at 312. 
61 National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).  These rights are called “Section 7 
activities” or “Section 7 rights”.  See REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 58, at 12.  
Concerted activity is when an employee acts “with or on the authority of other employees, and not 
solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.”  Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, at 497 
(1984), rev’d sub nom. Prill v. N.L.R.B., 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 948 (1985).  
Since concerted activity communications are protected, an employer with a social networking policy 
cannot “chill” employees from exercising their Section 7 rights.  See Layfette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 
824, 825 (1998). 
62 Overbroad policies are the type that restricts discussions about wages, constructive discharges, 
terminations of co-workers, and general criticisms of the employer and its management.  SURVEY OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES, supra note 58.  An employer needs to be careful that her policy does not chill 
concerted activity.  See supra text accompanying note 61. 
63 SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES, supra note 58, at 4. 
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the NLRA.64  First, the employee’s SNS post must be “related to an ongoing labor 
dispute.”65  Second, the SNS post cannot “be so disloyal, reckless or maliciously 
untrue as to lose [the NLRA’s] protection.”66  However, even if an employer’s 
SNS post is concerted activity, it is not protected if the employee’s SNS post 
“constitutes ‘insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty’ which . . . is adequate 
cause for discharge.”67  Thus, it follows that an employer does not violate the 
NLRA for terminating an employee should he reveal the employer’s trade secrets 
or confidential client information.  
The NLRB has applied these holdings to cases where an employer terminates 
an employee for SNS postings relating to the employer.68  Generally, the NLRB 
broadly construes what constitutes protected activity.69  In doing so, the NLRB 
displays a flexibility to adapt the law to the realities of the twenty-first century 
workplace.  The NLRB’s activity and holdings stand in stark contrast to the 
activities of state and federal judiciaries, as explored in Parts II.B and III.A-C. 
However, the NLRB’s holdings only apply to work-related correspondences, 
thus, reveal little about whether the NLRA protects posts about off-duty conduct.  
C.  Off-Duty Conduct Statutes 
Presently, twenty-nine states have statutes offering some protection for an 
employee’s off-duty conduct.70  Such statutes protect an employee’s many 
activities, such as smoking, drinking, moonlighting and other off-duty lawful 
conduct.71  Through these statutes, state legislatures have chipped away at the at-
will employment doctrine.72  Only four states protect general off-duty conduct.73   
 
 
State statutes vary in scope of their protection, and because of their broad 
language courts have been responsible for statutory interpretation.74  Consequently, 
statutory interpretation differs greatly.75  Generally, the “statutes are still undefined 
and require modification to better fit the growing Internet lifestyle.”76   
                                                            
64 See infra notes 65–66. 
65 Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
66 Id. (quoting Am. Golf Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1240 (2000)). 
67 Id. (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers 346 U.S. 464, 477–
78 (1953)).  
68 For example, one case involved an employee’s posted photographs and comments criticizing a 
sales event organized by the employer.  See REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 
58, at 6–9. 
69 See supra text accompany note 68.       
70 Roche, supra note 22, at 198. 
71 Id.  
72 Lipps, supra note 32, at 652, 655.  Employers attempted to restrict an employee from lawfully 
imbibing certain substances, or her participation in lawful conduct, out of “employer’s concerns about 
rising health care costs.”  Roche, supra note 22, at 198. 
73 Lipps, supra note 32, at 652, 655. 
74 Id. at 653.  
75 Id. at 653, 676 (“[S]uch divergent views on enforcement, remedies, and exception clauses . . . 
preclude consistent statutory interpretation.”). 
76 Id. at 655.  
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1.  California   
At first glance, sections 96(k)77 and 98.678 of the California Labor Code 
seem to limit at-will employment.79  Section 96(k) allows the Labor Commissioner 
to file an employee’s “[c]laim [] for los[t] wages as the result of demotion, 
suspension, or discharge from employment for lawful conduct occurring during 
nonworking hours away from the employer’s premises.”80  Section 98.6 states that 
“[n]o person shall discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate against 
any employee . . . because the employee . . . engaged in any conduct delineated in 
this chapter, including the conduct described in subdivision (k) of Section 96.”81  
When read together, it seems that the two sections forbid an employer from 
disciplining an employee for off-duty conduct.  However, California’s appellate 
courts limit such an application.   
In Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp., defendant Household 
Automotive Finance Corp. terminated plaintiff Barbee for dating a subordinate 
employee in violation of the employer’s policy.82  Barbee sued his former 
employer claiming that the employer infringed upon his constitutional right to 
privacy,83 and that his termination violated the public policy of section 96(k).84  
The court stated that section 96(k) did not confer “any substantive rights” upon an 
employee,85 but only “authorize[d] such claims to the Labor Commissioner to 
vindicate existing public policies in favor of individual employees.”86  Thus, 
section 96(k) only applies when an employee’s discipline or termination violated 
existing rights.87  The court further limited their holding in Barbee by finding that 
a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy must be based upon a 
right “protected by the Labor Code” specifically.88  Therefore, sections 96(k) and 
98.6 do not prevent an employer from disciplining or firing an employee for her 
off-duty SNS postings.89   
The court’s restrictive interpretation of sections 96(k) and 98.6 strips them of 
any “substantive protection.”90  Thus, the courts have prevented these laws from 
being applied to new circumstances.  If Caitlin Davis lived in California, she could 
                                                            
77 CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.). 
78 § 98.6 (Westlaw). 
79 Scott A. Freedman & Jessica A. Barajas, Monitoring and Regulating Employee Conduct in the 
Age of Social Media Web Sites, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 31, 2011, at 5, available at http://www.mpplaw.com 
/files/Publication/539d9780-2be5-49f2-aa3a-1ab41758b98c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
80e72941-2b0d-4533-ba32-298643269a58/MonitoringAndRegulatingEmployeeConduct.pdf. 
80 § 96(k) (Westlaw).  
81 § 98.6(a) (Westlaw). 
82 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 409 (Ct. App. 2003).   
83 Barbee’s privacy claim failed because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy due to 
the company’s policy that forbid a manager from dating a subordinate.  Id. at 411–12. 
84 Id. at 408.  
85 Id. at 413. 
86 Id. at 414. 
87 See id. at 412.  
88 Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 904 (Ct. App. 2003).  
89 See id. 
90 Lipps, supra note 32, at 662. 
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not sue the Patriots under these statutes because they do not confer any new 
substantive rights.  Since California is an at-will employment state,91 and sections 
96(k) and 98.6 do not create new causes of action, Caitlin Davis cannot protest her 
termination.92 
2.  Colorado  
Colorado’s statute forbids an employer from disciplining or terminating an 
employee for any “lawful activity off the premises of the employer during 
nonworking hours . . . .”93  An employer can restrict an employee’s off-duty 
conduct if the employee’s conduct “[r]elates to a bona fide occupational 
requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities 
and responsibilities,”94 or such conduct creates a conflict of interest “to the 
employer or the appearance of such a conflict of interest.”95  The statute protects 
an employee “who engage[s] in activities that are personally distasteful to their 
employer,” but are nonetheless “legal and unrelated to an employee’s job duties.”96 
In Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the court articulated the statute’s scope.97  
In Marsh, Delta Air Lines terminated Marsh for a letter he wrote to the Denver 
Post that criticized Delta’s hiring policies.98  The court held that the statute was not 
an “absolute” “shield” for any off-duty conduct.99  Thus, if an employee is arguing 
her privacy was violated, her rights are balanced against her employer’s business 
needs.100  The court adopted Delta Air Line’s argument that a duty of loyalty was 
an inherent “occupational requirement” within § 24–34–402.5(1)(a)’s exception.101  
Therefore, Marsh’s letter criticizing Delta Air Lines breached his duty of loyalty 
and his subsequent termination was legal.102   
In Marsh, the court’s willingness to create exceptions to the statute is 
disturbing and undermines the legislature’s broad language.  With such an 
ambiguous phrase as  “duty of loyalty,” an employer can argue that nearly 
anything violates such a duty.  For example, when applied to the above 
hypothetical, the Patriots can argue Caitlin Davis’s debauched photographs 
breached her duty of loyalty to the Patriots because her actions reflected poorly 
                                                            
91 See supra text accompanying note 32. 
92 See supra Part I. 
93 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24–34–402.5(1) (West, Westlaw through the end of the First Reg. 
Sess. of the 68th Gen. Assemb. (2011)).  
94  § 24–34–402.5(1)(a) (Westlaw). 
95  § 24–34–402.5(1)(b) (Westlaw).  
96 Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1462 (D. Colo. 1997).  In the same decision, 
the deciding court stated the statute’s application: “[T]his statute should protect the job security of 
homosexuals who would otherwise be fired by an employer who discriminates against gay people, 
members of Ross Perot’s new political party who are employed by a fervent democrat, or even smokers 
who are employed by an employer with strong anti-tobacco feelings.”  Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1460 (“Plaintiff wrote a letter to the editor of the Denver Post that strongly criticized 
Delta’s decision to employ hourly contract workers to replace laid–off full–time employees.”). 
99 Id. at 1463. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1462–63. 
102 Id. at 1463.  
2012 EMPLOYEES’ EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN SOCIAL NETWORKING 115 
 
upon her employer, just as Marsh’s letter reflected poorly on Delta Air Lines.  By 
restricting the statute’s application, the deciding court eliminated the statute’s 
effectiveness to protect off-duty conduct.   
Fortunately, later decisions limited the Marsh holding.  In Watson v. Public 
Service Co. of Colorado, the court held that § 24–34–402.5(1) applied to any and 
all lawful, off-duty conduct, regardless of whether it was work-related.103  In 
Watson, the employer terminated an employee because the employee called the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration off-duty.104  The employer argued 
§ 24–34–402.5(1) did not apply because the telephone call was work-related.105  
They further argued § 24–34–402.5(1) only applied to private, non-work related 
activities.106  The court rejected the employer’s argument; the court interpreted the 
statute’s language broadly, stating that “‘[a]ny’ means ‘all.’”107  The court limited 
the Marsh court’s decision influence by nothing that the Marsh court’s rationale 
relied on a decision that did not involve a claim under § 24–34–402.5(1).108  
Furthermore, no Colorado appellate court had adopted the Marsh court’s 
analysis.109   
If Caitlin Davis lived in Colorado, she could sue the Patriots for terminating 
her for her SNS photographs.  Although it was unsavory to pose for photographs in 
front of a passed-out young-man for one’s own amusement, it most certainly is not 
illegal.  Furthermore, Caitlin Davis’s photographs did not fall within the statute’s 
exceptions.110  Colorado’s broad statute offers a twenty-first century employee the 
ability to participate in SNS without the fear of an employer’s retribution.  
Furthermore, it still protects the employer’s business interests.111 
3.  New York 
New York’s off-duty statute protects an employee’s “legal recreational 
activities outside work hours, off the employer’s premises and without the use of 
the employer’s equipment or other property” and so long as it does not “create a 
material conflict of interest” to the employer’s business interests.112  Recreational 
activity is “any lawful, leisure-time activity . . . which is generally engaged in for 
recreational purposes.”113  It was this distinction—of an activity’s purpose—that 
influenced the court in New York v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. to hold that dating was 
not a recreational activity and was not a protected activity within § 201-d.114  By 
                                                            
103 207 P.3d 860, 864–65 (Colo. App. 2008). 
104 Id. at 863.  
105 Id. at 864.  
106 Id. 
107 Id. (quoting Kauntz v. HCA-Healthstone, L.L.C., 174 P.3d 813, 817 (Colo. App. 2007)). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 865. 
110 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24–34–402.5(1)(a) & (b) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 
First Reg. Sess. of the 68th Gen. Assemb. (2011)).  
111 See the exceptions in § 24–34–402.5(1)(1) & (b) (Westlaw). 
112 N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 201-d(2)(c), d(3)(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2011, chapters 1 to 55, 
57 to 521, 523 to 594, and 597 to 600 (2011)).  
113 § 201-d(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
114 621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (App. Div. 1995) (two employees terminated for dating each other in 
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the court’s logic, dating was wholly distinguishable from recreational activities 
because dating’s “indispensible element . . . [of] romance” was absent from 
recreational activities.115  The court reasoned that by listing specific activities in § 
201-d(1)(b)116 reflected the legislature’s “obvious intent” to restrict “statutory 
protection to [a] certain clearly defined categories of leisure-time activities.”117  
Through the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, personal relationships were deemed to be 
“outside the scope” of recreational activities the legislature envisioned to be 
protected under § 201-d.118 
Although the Southern District of New York refused to follow Wal-Mart in 
Pasch v. Katz Media Corp., dating is still not a protected under § 201-d.119  Critics 
railed applying such a narrow interpretation of § 201-d, but no court has adopted 
the rationale expressed in dissenting opinions.120  The court’s restrictive 
interpretation of § 201-d(1)(b)’s “recreational activities” was further entrenched by 
the Second Circuit’s decision in McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp.121  
Concluding that in the absence of evidence suggesting the New York Court of 
Appeals would hold differently, the Second Circuit was bound by the Wal-Mart 
                                                            
violation of company policy), aff’d, McCavitt v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(per curiam). 
115 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d at 158.  The court attempted to clarify the distinction 
between dating leisure-time activities through the following example: “[A]lthough a dating couple may 
go bowling and under the circumstances call that activity a “date”, when two individuals lacking 
amorous interest in one another go bowling or engage in any other kind of “legal recreational activity”, 
they are not ‘dating.’”  Id. 
116 The non-exhaustive list of protected activities include “sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading 
and the viewing of television, movies and similar material.”  § 201-d(1)(b). 
117 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d at 158. 
118 Id. 
119 94 Civ. 8554, 1995 WL 469710, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995) (employee alleged she was 
demoted for dating a former co-employee).  Rejecting Wal-Mart’s rationale, the court held that the 
legislature intended § 201-d to include all social activities.  Id. at *5.  The court stated that the 
legislative history showed that the “purpose of the statute is to prohibit employers from discriminating 
against their employees simply because the employer does not like the activities an employee engages 
in after work.”  Id.    
120 The Pasch court’s opinion adopted Justice Paul J. Yesawich, Jr.’s dissent in Wal-Mart.  See id.  
Justice Yesawich interpreted § 201-d(1)(b)’s expansive categories of “hobbies” and “sports” as 
signifying the legislature’s intent to broadly define recreational activities to include social relationships.  
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Yesawich, J., dissenting).  Justice Yesawich also pointed 
out that inherent in the statute was the intent to protect “a certain degree” of an employee’s freedom to 
choose her own life during off-duty hours.  Id.  To interpret the statute otherwise hampered § 201-
d(1)(b) “remedial purpose.”  Id. 
 And despite conceding that the Second Circuit was bound by Wal-Mart’s precedent in McCavitt, 
Judge Joseph M. McLaughlin explained the holding’s absurdity: 
  If, when deciding to protect “recreational activities,” the Legislature saw fit 
to protect an employee’s right to engage in such historically revered activities as 
riding a motorcycle and hang–gliding, it certainly should have extended 
protection to the pursuit of a romantic relationship with whomever an employee 
chooses–even a fellow, unmarried employee outside the office, during non–
working hours. 
  It is repugnant to our most basic ideals in a free society that an employer can 
destroy an individual’s livelihood on the basis of whom he is courting, without 
first having to establish that the employee’s relationship is adversely affecting the 
employer’s business interests. 
McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 169 (McLaughlin, J., concurring). 
121 Id. at 166.  
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decision.122   
Despite the seemingly broad grant of protection guaranteed in § 201-d, 
subsequent court interpretations have rendered the expansive language 
meaningless.  Section 201-d offers little protection because “recreational activity” 
is narrowly construed.123  If Caitlin Davis lived in New York, the Patriots 
termination would not violate § 201-d.  If an employer can terminate an employee 
for her choice of intimate relationships,124 it is difficult to surmise that a court 
would hold debauched photographs posted to an SNS to be within § 201-d’s 
protection.  
4.  North Dakota 
On its face, North Dakota’s statute offers broad protection for an employee’s 
lawful off-duty conduct, so long as said conduct is “not in direct conflict” with the 
employer’s “business-related interests,”125 or “contrary to a bona fide occupational 
qualification that reasonably and rationally relates to the employment activities and 
the responsibilities of a particular employee.”126  However, the courts have held 
that certain exceptions are inherent to the statute, and thus, certain off-duty conduct 
does not warrant the statute’s protection.  For example, the court has held that 
certain employees have a duty of loyalty to his employer.127  By creating 
exceptions not contained within the statute’s language, an employee cannot know 
what sort of off-duty conduct is protected.   
Furthermore, the statute does not clearly define “lawful activity” which 
further complicates the question of what types of conduct is protected.128  In 
Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, Hougum was arrested for masturbating in a 
public bathroom’s stall; his employer, Valley Memorial Homes, terminated 
Hougum as a result of the arrest.129  Hougum sued Valley Memorial Homes for 
violating § 14-02.4-03.130  Hougum argued that he engaged in lawful activity 
because the public restroom stall was a temporarily private space.131  Due to 
previous precedents,132 the court refused to determine whether Hougum’s off-duty 
                                                            
122 Id. at 168.  
123 See supra notes 114–22.  
124 See New York v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (App. Div. 1995); Pasch, No. 
94 Civ. 8554, 1995 WL 469710, at *4–5.  
125 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. and Spec. Sess.). 
126 § 14-02.4-08 (Westlaw) (emphasis added).  The “occupational qualification” must relate to a 
particular employee, and not to “all employees of that employer.”  Id.  This section of the statute is a 
limitation to the at-will employment doctrine.  Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th 
Cir. 1995).  
127 See Fatland, 62 F.3d at 1072–73 (holding that employee’s termination because of his ownership 
in a competing business was not discrimination for lawful off-duty conduct in violation of § 14-02.04-
03 or -8, and that said ownership was a “legitimate source of concern” for the employer).  
128 § 14-02.4-03.  
129 574 N.W.2d 812, 815 (N.D. Ct. App. 1998). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 820.  Masturbating in a public place is illegal under § 12.1–20–12.1 of the North Dakota 
Code.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1–20–12.1 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. and Spec. Sess.).  
132 The court noted that the enclosed stall of a public restroom was generally not considered a 
“public” place.  Hougum, 574 N.W.2d at 821 (citations omitted).  This created a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Hougum’s conduct was forbidden by law.  Id at 822.  If Hougum’s activity 
118 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. VI:I 
 
conduct was lawful or unlawful activity.133  The court noted that Valley Memorial 
Homes’s potential conflicts claim134 was very different from the employer 
conflicts in Fatland.135  In refusing to decide what was lawful within the statute, 
the court further complicated the matter for employees.  By noting the difference 
between the employer’s interests in Fatland and Hougum,136 the court muddled the 
issue for employers: Is a non-economic interest, like business efficiency, still a 
viable business interest?  Without clarification from either the courts or legislatures 
on the statute’s boundaries, both sides of the issue—employees and employers 
alike—do not derive any benefit from the statute because the boundaries of 
protection are still undefined. 
However, such ambiguity may be to the advantage of emerging issues, like 
termination for lawful off-duty conduct as depicted on SNS.  Under Fatland, if an 
employee’s SNS postings do not involve her employer, it can be speculated that 
such conduct is protected because it does not explicitly implicate an employer’s 
business.137   
Thus, if applying North Dakota’s statute to Caitlin Davis’s situation, the 
Patriots cannot elucidate a legitimate business-related interest or explain how the 
content depicted in Caitlin Davis’s photographs reasonably related to a 
cheerleader’s occupational qualifications, her act of posting photographs would be 
protected activity.  Furthermore, this analysis holds even if SNS content is deemed 
“public” because the statute’s language only concerns activity that is “off the 
employer’s premises during nonworking hours.”138  Thus, an employee’s SNS 
postings and its content are protected, regardless of the privacy settings.  Such a 
wide grant of protection is ideal for an emerging issue because it is flexible to a 
changing society.  
D.  Privacy  
At common law, the Constitution protects a person from governmental 
invasion, but individual states confer a cause of action upon its citizens for such 
invasions.139  An intrusion upon seclusion claim is the type of claim an employee 
would use to support an employee’s invasion of privacy claim.140  To sustain a 
cause of action for the intrusion upon seclusion, the Restatement requires an 
                                                            
was lawful, it could have been protected under the statute, and thus, any subsequent termination would 
have violated the statute.  Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id.  (“[The employer] . . . has raised a claim Hougum’s activity undermined his effectiveness as 
a chaplain and therefore directly conflicted with its business-related interests.”). 
135 Id.  (“The potential conflicts raised by [the employer] are not the same type of business and 
economic conflicts of interest at stake in Fatland.”) (citations omitted). 
136 Compare Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F.3d 1070, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 1995), with Hougum, 
574 N.W.2d at 822.  
137 See id. 
138 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. and Spec. Sess.). 
139 62 AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 2 (2011) (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 
(1922)).  The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes four types of privacy invasions—the intrusion 
upon seclusion; appropriation of name or likeness; publicity of private life; and false light.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 62(A)(2)(a)–(d) (1977). 
140 Rutkowski & Rutkowski, Employee’s Privacy Rights, supra note 25, at 5–6.  
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intrusion into the personal affairs or concerns of another that is highly offensive to 
a reasonable person.141  Generally, a claimant must plead and prove four elements 
in order to sustain a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion.142  First, an 
individual must make an unauthorized intrusion or pry into one’s seclusion; 
second, the intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person; third, the 
matter must be private; and finally, the intrusion must cause emotional distress.143  
Presently, courts do not recognize the act of viewing a website, even a SNS 
personal profile, to be highly offensive to a reasonable person.144  
Even if the common law privacy claim was a viable cause of action, not all 
states recognize the common law right of privacy.145  Therefore, this claim is not 
available to many citizens.  Unless states without a common law privacy claim 
recognized a right of privacy in their case law or statutes, an employee cannot 
assert this claim against her employer.  Such a reality leaves an employee without 
a way to fight against an employer making arbitrary employment decisions based 
upon off-duty SNS posts. 
III.  CASES 
Generally, state courts have recognized public policy exceptions to at-will 
employment,146 but state courts are hesitant to extend public policy exceptions to 
general off-duty behavior.147  Presently, no courts have litigated whether an 
employer’s adverse employment decision based upon an employee’s off-duty SNS 
postings violated the employee’s rights.  State courts have confronted whether 
content from an individual’s SNS profile is discoverable for evidentiary 
purposes.148  Thus, this Comment will apply existing case law to the Caitlin Davis 
hypothetical to analyze the failure of the present case holdings to resolve these 
issues.  
A.  Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group 
In Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, the co-plaintiff,149 Brian Pietrylo 
(“Pietrylo”) created a group on Myspace.com called “The Spec-Tator.”150  The 
                                                            
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (1977) (“One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the invasion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.”). 
142 Intrusion Upon Seclusion, Overview, IT LAW WIKI, http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Intrusion_upon_ 
seclusion#cite_note-0 (last visited Jan. 15, 2012) (citing Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013–14 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). 
143 Id. 
144 Lipps, supra note 32, at 651. 
145 For example, New York does not recognize a common law right to privacy.  Rutkowski & 
Rutkowski, Social Media Policies, supra note 29, at 4.   
146 See Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).  
147 Lipps, supra note 32, at 650.  
148 See infra discussion Parts III.B–C. 
149 A fellow employee, Doreen Marino (“Marino”), was also a party to this action.  Pietrylo v. 
Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06–5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *1 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008) [hereinafter 
Pietrylo I]. 
150 Id.  
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group’s purpose was to give the past and present employees of Houston’s 
Restaurant an “entirely private” space to vent, “without any outside eyes spying 
in.”151  Membership was by invitation only.152  Once a member was invited and he 
accepted, the member accessed The Spec-Tator to read postings or to add new 
postings.153  No managers were invited to join The Spec-Tator, and none were 
given a password.154  Members discussed various topics on The Spec-Tator, such 
as jokes about Houston’s customer service requirements, “sexual remarks about 
management and customers,” and “references to violence and illegal drug use.”155   
A greeter at Houston’s, who was also a member of The Spec-Tator, showed 
the postings to a manager.156  The manager was offended by the comments and 
shared them with other members of the management team.157  Restaurant managers 
asked the greeter for her username and password so they could view The Spec-
Tator’s postings, “which they did five times before firing” the plaintiffs.158  As a 
result of their termination, Pietrylo and Marino sued Houston’s under seven causes 
of action, one being the common law invasion of privacy.159 
At his deposition, Pietrylo stated all of the postings were jokes, but members 
of the management team testified to the posts’ offensiveness.160  In particular, 
regional supervisor Robert Marano testified that he was concerned about how the 
postings would affect Houston’s operations.161  The court found that a genuine 
issue of material fact existed regarding whether Pietrylo and Marino had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in The Spec-Tator, and for that reason, the jury 
decided the issue.162 
Ultimately, the jury rejected the plaintiffs’ privacy invasion claim.163  The 
jury sheet revealed that the jury recognized The Spec-Tator as a “place of solitude 
and seclusion” designed to “protect the [p]latiniffs’ private affairs and 
concerns.”164  However, because of The Spec-Tator’s secluded status, the jury did 
not find that the plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that space.165  
                                                            
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id.  
154 Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 2:06–cv–05754–FSH–PS, 2009 WL 2342553 (D.N.J. June 
26, 2009) [hereinafter Pietrylo III]. 
155 Pietrylo I, 2008 WL 6085437, at *3–4.  
156 Id. at *2. 
157 Id. at *3–4. 
158 Pietrylo III, 2009 WL 2342553, at *2. 
159 Pietrylo I, 2008 WL 6085437, at *4–5.  The other causes of action were for violations of the 
federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006); the parallel New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3, -4(d) (West 2008); the federal Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2006); New Jersey’s parallel provision, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:156A–27 (West 2008); and wrongful termination in violation of public policy—first, for violating 
public policy favoring freedom of speech, and for violating public policy against privacy invasions.  Id. 
160 Id.  
161 Id.  Specifically, Marano was worried that the posts contradicted Houston’s “four core values” 
of “professionalism, positive mental attitude, aim to please approach, and teamwork.”  Id. 
162 Id. at *7.  
163 Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06CV05754, 2009 WL 1867659 (D.N.J. June 16, 2009) 
[hereinafter Pietrylo II]. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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Thus, their privacy claim failed.166  Although the jury did not find for the plaintiffs 
on their privacy claim, the case still establishes that employers can be found liable 
for using information from SNS to discipline or terminate their employees, 
especially if the employer obtained that information without the employees’ 
consent.167 
B.  EEOC v. Simply Storage Management, L.L.C. 
In EEOC v. Simply Storage Management, L.L.C., the court held that the 
EEOC must produce a claimant’s relevant SNS communications per a defendant’s 
discovery request.168  Two claimants alleged that the defendant, Simply Storage, 
was liable for sexual harassment.169  The relevant issue was whether the claimants’ 
SNS profiles and other communications were within the scope of discovery for the 
defendants.170  The defendants sought “all status updates, messages, wall 
comments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, details, 
blurbs, comments, and applications,” photos and videos posted within a certain 
time frame.171  Significantly, the court interpreted “SNS profile” to mean 
absolutely any and all content that an SNS user posted to her profile.  
The EEOC objected to producing all SNS profile content, partly because it 
would “improperly infringe on claimants’ privacy”; the EEOC also argued that 
SNS content production should be restricted to content that “directly address[ed] or 
comment[ed] on matters alleged in the complaint.”172  To the court, the “main 
challenge” was defining “appropriately broad limits” on SNS content’s 
discoverability in a way consistent with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b).173  The court developed a “test” that the claimants had to provide copies of 
all SNS content that “reveal[ed], refer[red], or relate[d] to any emotion, feeling, or 
mental state, as well as communications that reveal[ed], refer[red], or relate[d] to 
events that could reasonably be expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling, 
or mental state.”174  Thus, the court interpreted SNS content to be anything 
relevant to a case’s issues.175 
                                                            
166 Pietrylo III, 2009 WL 2342553, at *2.  However, the jury found the defendant to have violated 
the federal Stored Communication Act and New Jersey’s parallel provision; and the jury awarded 
Pietrylo and Marino over $13,000 in back pay, compensatory, and punitive damages.  Galit Kiercut, 
Recent Developments in Employment Law and the Impact of Technology on Workplace Trends, 
ASPATORE, 2011 WL 4452119 *1, *2 (Aug. 2011).  
167 Id. 
168 EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., L.L.C., 270 F.R.D. 430, 437 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
169 Id. at 432.  
170 Id. 
171 Id.  The timeframe in question here was from April 23, 2007 until the hearing.  Id. 
172 Id. at 432, 434. 
173 Id. at 433–34. 
174 Id. at 436.  The court reasoned that the EEOC’s request that claimants produce only 
communications that directly referenced their sexual harassment claims was too restrictive.  Id. at 435.  
However, to require the claimants to provide all SNS content ignored the reality that just because a 
claimant was active on her SNS profile did not mean the activity was relevant to a claim or defense at 
issue in the litigation.  Id.  
175 Id. 
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C.  Romano v. Steelcase, Inc. 
In Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., Romano claimed that the defendant, Steelcase, 
Inc., caused her to suffer injuries that negatively affected her “enjoyment of 
life.”176  SNS content was at issue because Steelcase, Inc. argued that reviewing 
public portions of the plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace pages showed she had “an 
active lifestyle” in the time period she claimed her injuries prevented such 
pursuits.177  As a result of how Romano’s SNS photographs belied her claim, 
Steelcase, Inc. requested “full access to and copies of [the] [p]laintiff’s current and 
historical records/information on her Facebook and MySpace accounts.”178  
Romano refused on the grounds that providing such content violated her rights to 
privacy.179  Although this Comment will not explore the evidentiary implications 
of holding SNS profiles discoverable, the court’s rationale reveals how courts view 
an individual’s privacy expectations in her SNS profile.  
The Romano court relied on decisions from other jurisdictions.180  First, the 
Romano court applied the Second Circuit’s dicta in United States v. Lifshiz—which 
analogized emails to letters—to the issue of SNS privacy.181  By analogizing 
emails to letters, the Lifshiz court held that a person did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her emails.182  The Romano court concluded the same 
rationale extended to SNS profile content.183  Unfortunately, the Romano court 
ignored the Lifshiz court’s fairly limited analogy—the only significant difference 
between emails and letters is the delivery method.  Thus, while it was reasonable 
for the Lifshiz court to hold that there is no privacy expectation in emails, it was 
not reasonable for the Romano court to apply the Lifshiz’s holding to SNS profile 
privacy.  The content, audience, and general nature of SNS profiles are radically 
different from that of emails; the Romano court applied a somewhat antiquated 
standard to a completely new type of technology.  The Romano court ignored the 
issues and concerns that arise with a new technology type.  
More disturbing was the Romano court’s adoption, by way of reference, of 
other jurisdictions’ rationales for denying that a user has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in her SNS posts.  According to Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of New Jersey, an individual’s privacy concerns are de minimis when the 
individual posted the content to their profile.184  By this rationale, an individual 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any of her postings, regardless 
                                                            
176 30 Misc. 3d 426, 429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  
177 Id.  Romano traveled within the time period alleged.  Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 432. 
 The case dictates that the relevancy of certain evidence cannot be withheld by “hid[ing] behind self-
set privacy controls on a website” if that evidence is both material and relevant, and the plaintiff is 
claiming substantial damages for the loss of enjoyment of life.  Id. at 431.  
180 Id. at 433. 
181 Id. (citing United States v. Lifshiz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
182 Id. (“[E]mails would be analogous to a letter–writer whose expectation of privacy ordinarily 
terminates upon delivery of the letter.”). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. (citing Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., No. 06–5537, 2007 WL 7393489 
(D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2007)). 
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of her profile’s privacy settings.  The court in Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc. 
held that an individual has no “reasonable expectation of privacy where that person 
took [the] affirmative act of posting [to her] own [SNS profile], making it available 
to anyone with a computer and opening it up to the public eye.”185   
In contemplating its holding, the Romano court went a step further by 
holding that: 
[W]hen [Romano] created her [SNS] accounts, she consented to the fact that her 
personal information would be shared with others, notwithstanding her privacy 
settings . . . . Since [Romano] knew that her information may become publicly 
available, she cannot now claim that she had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.186 
Here, by holding that an SNS user cannot have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, regardless of her privacy settings, the court erases the possibility of 
addressing the question in the near future. The implications of the Romano court’s 
holding are explored further in Part IV.A. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Potential Consequences of the Above Holdings  
The three cases above, when examined in their totality, paint a disturbing 
portrait of how courts perceive emerging technology and privacy.  Significantly, 
the courts have shown they are not willing to recognize that an individual has an 
expectation of privacy in an SNS profile.  These holdings represent a major boon 
to employers because if an employee’s profile is not private, then it logically 
follows that an employer is free to use an SNS profile’s content in her employment 
decisions, regardless of what the content represents.   
SNS profile participants run the gamut of all types of people.  To hold all 
profiles as being inherently public187 is an overextension of the public’s 
expectations.  Furthermore, it cannot be said that an employee who takes the 
affirmative act to set her SNS profile access to “private”188 does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy; if that were not true, then why would there be 
privacy settings?  If an individual did not believe her SNS profile was private, then 
why would she take the steps to protect it?189  And why would an SNS developer 
continue offering privacy settings if no one can be said to respect them?  
Additionally, it seems unjust that SNS participants are to have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an SNS profile’s content on the mere possibility it may 
                                                            
185 Id. (citing Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125 (Ct. App. 2009)).  
186 Id. at 434 (emphasis added). 
187 See id. at 434.  
188 See discussion supra Part I about SNS privacy settings. 
189 The Romano court attempted to buttress the argument that an SNS user cannot claim a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in her SNS profile’s content by pointing to the fact no SNS website 
offers a guarantee of complete privacy.  Romano, 30 Misc. 3d at 434.  However, the Romano court still 
includes Facebook’s language that privacy settings are offered to allow a user to limit access to her SNS 
profile.  Id.  Even if there is not complete privacy, SNS developers still offer users the option to restrict 
access to their profile.  See discussion supra Part I.  This strongly suggests that SNS developers 
recognize, on some level, that users view their SNS profile’s content as private.  
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become public.190  A court should not be allowed to erase a privacy expectation 
because of something as tenuous as the qualifier “may.” 
Courts focus on certain aspects of SNS—that they are meant to share—
ignoring privacy settings.191  Instead, courts seem content to paint all SNS activity 
with the same brush.  Just because a person has an SNS profile to connect with her 
friend and family does not mean her SNS profile, and all its content, should be 
deemed public in the eyes of the law.  Furthermore, it is unreasonable to accept, as 
the Romano court contends, that SNS profiles are, by their very nature, public, or 
“else they would cease to exist.”192  People use SNS to connect with people,193 not 
to advertise their lives to anyone with an Internet connection.  The mere existence 
of privacy settings suggests that there is a privacy expectation within SNS postings 
as recognized by the SNS developers themselves.194  A person should not be 
forced to surrender her SNS profile’s content to the entire Internet-using public195 
just to participate in the self-expression of SNS.196  If these holdings are carried to 
their furthest conclusion, the results are far too broad and overreaching.   
Courts are supposed to evolve and adapt to society, and presently, the 
public’s participation in SNS is too entrenched in modern life for the courts to 
ignore the issues of privacy.   
B.  New Definition of “Legitimate Business Interest” in the Context of SNS 
Posts 
An employer can claim a legitimate business interest in parts of her business 
where she has invested money.197  Thus, an employer has a legitimate business 
interest to protect not only traditional business information, such as client lists, but 
also more intangibles, like its reputation.198  However, the term legitimate business 
interests is ambiguous and amorphous; even the meaning of a fairly static term like 
“reputation” can be a product of interpretation and context.  As a result, an 
employer can too easily claim any employment decision is founded upon a 
legitimate business interest.  
In an effort to tether a flighty phrase like legitimate business interest to the 
ground, some jurisdictions have defined a legitimate business interests.  It is 
beneficial to examine these definitions for what they reveal as being what the 
legislatures and courts pinpoint as being the essence of legitimate business 
interests.  From these statutes, this Comment will propose a new definition of 
legitimate business interest to evaluate whether an employer’s business interest is 
implicated by an employee’s SNS content. 
Florida’s definition of legitimate business interest developed within the 
                                                            
190 See Romano, 30 Misc. 3d at 434. 
191 See id. 
192 Id.  
193 See FACEBOOK, supra note 13. 
194 See supra notes 15–16. 
195 See Romano, 30 Misc. 3d at 434. 
196 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010). 
197 See Roche, supra note 22, at 189. 
198 Id. at 190. 
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context of evaluating the legality of restrictive covenants.199  However, the relevant 
statute, Florida Statute § 542.335, has a non-exhaustive list of legitimate business 
interests.200  Legitimate business interest includes trade secrets;201 valuable 
confidential business information; “substantial relationships with specific 
prospective or existing customers, patients, or clients”; client goodwill associated 
with a business’s “trade name,202 trademark,203 service mark,204 or ‘trade 
dress’”;205 and specialized training.206 
The restrictive and limited language of the above-mentioned statutes and 
case law does not offer an employer protection for interests that may fall outside of 
the above parameters.  Nor would such a restrictive definition benefit an employee.  
In the face of such limited language, it is reasonably foreseeable that an employer 
would implement an SNS policy to outright forbid an employee’s use of SNS; an 
employer could adopt this self-help to protect his business interests in a way that 
the legislature or courts do not.207  Should an employee disobey such a policy in an 
effort to maintain relationships through SNS, she would be subject to the same sort 
of adverse employment decisions this Comment seeks to resolve.  However, the 
statute pinpoints the most crucial component of legitimate business interests—
customers and clients.  The importance of customers is reinforced by Illinois’s 
seven-factor test for determining a legitimate business interest.  
In Illinois, courts look at seven factors to determine if an employer has a 
legitimate business interest.208  The seven factors are: 
(1) the length of time required to develop clientele; (2) the amount of money 
invested to acquire clients; (3) the degree of difficulty in acquiring clients; (4) the 
extent of personal customer contact by the employee; (5) the extent of the 
employer’s knowledge of its clients; (6) the duration of the customer’s association 
with the employer; and (7) the continuity of the employer–customer 
relationships.209 
                                                            
199 See Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2009).  
Florida statute section 542.335 is a “framework for analyzing, evaluating and enforcing restrictive 
covenants contained in employment contracts.”  Id. (quoting Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 9 So. 3d 1258, 
1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)).  
200 FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.).  A restrictive 
covenant not supported by one or more legitimate business interests is void and unenforceable as a 
matter of law.  Id. 
201 A trade secret is defined as being “[a] formula, process, device, or other business information 
that is kept confidential to maintain an advantage over competitors” that has independent economic 
value and is kept secret through reasonable efforts.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 727 (3d ed. 2006). 
202 A trade name is “[a] name, style, or symbol used to distinguish a company, partnership, or 
business (as opposed to a product or service); the name under which a business operates.”  Id. 
203 Generally, a trademark is “[a] word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol used by a 
manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of others.”  Id. 
204 A servicemark is “[a] name, phrase, or other device used to identify and distinguish the services 
of a certain provider.”  Id. at 649.  
205 Trade dress is a business’s total image.  See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763, 763 (1992).  
206 FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.).   
207 See supra text accompanying note 58.  
208 See Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 402 (Ill. 2011). 
209 Hanchett Paper Co., v. Melchiorre, 792 N.E.2d 395, 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); aff’d, Reliable Fire 
Equip. Co., at 402. 
126 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. VI:I 
 
Factors are assessed within the “totality of the facts and circumstances” of 
each case, with no single factor dispositive.210  Instead, factors are “nonconclusive 
aids.”211 
Presently, “legitimate business interest(s)” are prime for an employer’s 
manipulation to terminate an employee for her off-duty conduct, regardless of 
whether it negatively affected an employer’s business interests.  Since an employer 
should only be able to terminate an employee for off-duty SNS posts that implicate 
an employer’s legitimate business interest, this Comment proposes a new standard 
to determine if an employee’s SNS post damaged, or could damage, her 
employer’s legitimate business interests.212  If an employer cannot establish that 
the employee’s SNS content damages an employer’s legitimate business interest, 
then the employer’s adverse employment decision is illegal.  
Thus, bearing the above in mind, this Comment proposes the following:  to 
have an actionable legitimate business interest(s) to discipline or terminate an 
employee for the content of her off-duty, non-work related SNS post, an employer 
must show that the SNS post has damaged, or will substantially damage, the 
employer’s relationship with specific prospective or existing customers, patients, 
or clients.213  Factors a court may consider to evaluate this relationship include, but 
is not limited to: the length of time undertaken to develop clientele; the amount of 
money invested to develop client(s); employer’s knowledge of its clientele; and the 
duration of the customer’s relationship with the employer.214  An employer cannot 
require that an employee give the employer access to her SNS profile as a 
condition of employment.215  If an employee’s off-duty, non-work related conduct 
                                                            
210 Reliable Fire Equip. Co., at 403.  
211 Id.  The seven–factor test is used with a “three-prong rule of reason” to “determine the 
enforceability of a restrictive covenant not to compete.”  Id.  The three-prong rule of reason is 
“reasonable only if the covenant: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of a legitimate 
business interest of the employer-promisee; (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee-
promisor, and (3) is not injurious to the public.”  Id. at 396 (citing BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 
N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999)). 
212 In general, courts assess legitimate business interests within the context of determining the 
enforceability of non–compete covenants in employment contracts.  See generally R.P. Davis, Validity 
and Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Contracts of Employment, 98 A.L.R. 963 (1935); LOUIS 
ALTMAN & MARIA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 
16:32 (4th ed. 2011), available at 2 Callmann on Unfair Comp., Tr. & Mono. § 16:32 (Westlaw). 
213 See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (1996). 
214 See Hanchett Paper Co., 792 N.E.2d at 401. 
215 A recent trend has developed of employers requesting potential employees to give the employer 
their SNS passwords.  Because employees have availed themselves to Facebook’s privacy settings, it 
has become “more difficult for outsiders to look in.”  Rebecca Greenfield, It’s Getting Harder for Your 
Employer to Use Facebook Against You, THE ATLANTIC WIRE (Sep. 7, 2011), 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2011/09/its-getting-harder-your-employer-use-facebook-
against-you/42170.  As a result, employers are desperate to find “other ways to reclaim the insights” 
that SNS profiles provide, and thus, have started requiring that potential employees give their SNS’s 
passwords as part of the interview process.  Megan Garber, Would You Give Job Interviewers Your 
Facebook Password? Because They Might Ask, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2012, 10:18 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/would-you-give-job-interviewers-your-
facebook-password-because-they-might-ask/254810.  However, employees have spoken out against this 
practice.  In the public sector, the Maryland Department of Corrections was forced to discontinue this 
practice when the American Civil Liberties Union got involved.  Greenfield, supra.  In New York, a 
statistician “ended a job interview after he was asked to provide his Facebook password during its 
proceedings.”  Garber, supra.   
 There is concern that such a practice will become commonplace.  On May 2, 2012, Maryland 
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is illegal, the employer cannot discipline or terminate the employee without 
showing damage to her business interests.  This definition of legitimate business 
interest and its factors are applicable within the specific context of adverse 
employment decisions made on the basis of an employee’s SNS profile’s content. 
The above defines legitimate business interests in terms of the essence of 
business—relationships with a party willing to pay for the business’s services.  It 
goes without saying that a business, from doctors to restaurants to contractors, 
cannot succeed without a paying clientele.  By equating legitimate business interest 
with customer/client relationships, much of the ambiguity surrounding terms like 
“reputation interest” is removed.  The confusion is removed because the employer 
is forced to pinpoint how an employee’s SNS content will damage the employer’s 
business in a concrete way, as opposed to supposition.   
Another benefit of the above definition is that it puts the burden on the 
employer to prove how the employee’s SNS posts will harm the employer’s 
business by damaging client relationships.  This makes sense because the employer 
is in a better position to provide such information.   
This is beneficial because it places the burden on the employer to both 
explain and show the negative impact of their employee’s SNS posts.  By requiring 
the employer to demonstrate how said posts impact their relationships with 
customers, the employer is forced to elucidate a sound basis for his adverse 
employment decisions.  Instead of a knee-jerk reaction to an employee’s lifestyle 
choices, an employer must look to his customer’s opinion, and not rely on his own 
opinions.216  In so doing, an employer cannot make an adverse employment 
decision because an employer dislikes an employee’s lifestyle choice.  It forbids an 
employer from relying on the supposition that an employee’s off-duty, non-work 
related SNS postings will have a negative impact on the employer’s business 
relationship because the employer must point to specific, verifiable sets of 
customers.  The employer is in a better position to evaluate such relationships.  
Furthermore, this definition is good for employers because it recognizes her right 
                                                            
became the first state to pass a law prohibiting employers from demanding Facebook passwords from 
either their present or prospective employees.  Labor and Employment—User Name Privacy Protection 
and Exclusions, ch. 233 (codified as MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3–712 (Oct. 1, 2012); Saul 
Ewing LLP, Governor O’Malley Signs Maryland Law Prohibiting Employers from Seeking Access to 
Personal Social Media Information; Other States Considering Similar Bans, JD SUPRA (May 2, 2012), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/governor-omalley-signs-maryland-law-pro-75409. State legislatures 
in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Washington are considering similar 
bans.  Saul Ewing LLP, supra.  Such a practice by employers may soon violate federal law.  On April 
27, 2012, Representative Eliot Engel of New York and Representative Jan Schakowsky of Illinois 
introduced the Social Networking Online Protection Act, which will subject violators to a $10,000.00 
fine.  Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 5050, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).   
 Given how quickly both state and federal legislatures have responded to this practice, asking for an 
SNS password violates an individual’s privacy; it follows that using any information obtained from an 
SNS profile in such a way also violates a person’s privacy.  It is unclear as to whether employers will be 
prohibited from demanding SNS passwords from both employees and prospective employees in all 
state’s legislation.  However, given that both Maryland’s law and the proposed House bill prevent 
employers from making SNS passwords a condition of employment for either employees or prospective 
employees, it logically follows that such is the standard in the other states’ legislation.  Furthermore, it 
does not address the main topic of this article—whether employers can use information from SNS 
profiles, without the password, in employment decisions. 
216 This Comment does not focus on what level of an employer’s knowledge is sufficient to show 
that his business relationship with customers or potential customers will be damaged by the employee’s 
off-duty, non-work related posts.   
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to protect her legitimate business interests. 
The factors benefit the employer as well.  They help refine the definition’s 
specificity requirement.  Factors give an employer a guideline of what an employer 
can point to when evaluating how an employee’s SNS post damages her legitimate 
business interest.  Furthermore, by not requiring that the employer use the above 
factors, it recognizes that the employer has a legitimate business relationship in 
things like new clients or customers; it recognizes that there is a need to protect 
business relationships that have not yet fully developed, but should be protected.  
Because the employer carries a burden to show cause for an adverse employment 
decision, it is not necessary to require them to pass a factor test.  Instead, an 
employer may point to certain factors if the factors assist to clarify her position. 
This definition is also best for an employee because it forces the employer to 
articulate exactly how the employee’s SNS postings damage the employer’s 
business through a loss or harmed business relationship.  Thus, it is much more 
difficult—if not impossible—for an employer to base employment decisions on his 
distaste for an employee’s lifestyle choices, or, on the supposition that an 
employee’s lifestyle choices could negatively impact the employer’s business.  An 
employer will not be able to react to an employee’s off-duty SNS post without 
proof of the postings potential or actual damage to the business.  This ultimately 
protects an employee’s interests by protecting her right to participate in SNS. 
Furthermore, this definition restores a degree of privacy to an employee’s 
SNS posts.217  An employer may see the employee’s SNS posts, but the employer 
cannot base adverse employment decisions upon an employee’s SNS postings if 
said postings do not affect the employer’s business relationships.  Thus, an 
employee can participate in SNS without fearing it will lead to employment 
discipline or termination.   
In applying the above to Caitlin Davis’s situation, the Patriots would have to 
show exactly how her photographs damaged the Patriots’ relationship with their 
customers.  This could be ticketholders, vendors, or advertisers—businesses have 
customer bases.  However, for the Patriots, no matter how distasteful Caitlin 
Davis’s photographs were, it would be difficult to find cause to terminate her.  Are 
an eighteen-year-old’s photographs really going to prevent the Patriots from selling 
tickets?  From obtaining advertisers?  The above definition forces an employer to 
make decisions that are realistic within the context of his business.  An NFL team 
is made up of far more than a cheerleader.  If the above definition existed during 
Caitlin Davis’s publicity troubles, most likely, she could not have been fired.   
Most importantly, the above definition gives a zone of privacy around a 
person’s decisions.  No matter how immature or bizarre a decision may be, the 
individual is entitled to make her own choices without the noose of employment 
discipline or termination looming over her.  And in that freedom, a person has the 
privacy to make choices knowing her employer cannot harm her employment 
situation without cause.  Certainly, someone like a Caitlin Davis would have 
“paid” for her distasteful photographs, but it would have been eternal 
embarrassment or criticism.  An employer’s influence should not extend into an 
employee’s life once she is off-duty and free to structure her own time.  An 
                                                            
217 See discussion infra Part I. 
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employee should be free to make legal, off-duty choices—even bad choices—and 
post about said choices on her SNS profile.  If someone makes a bad decision—
like posing for photos of an individual with swastikas drawn all over him—that 
individual will get enough flak from her SNS profile followers to learn a lesson.  
The cost need not be in the form of losing her job.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is not ideal that a large portion of an individual’s life is lived in the semi-
public sphere of SNS profiles; however, it is reality.  SNS are not a fleeting trend.  
Courts should construct laws that recognize the realities of life as it is presently 
lived, which is why courts should protect a person’s expectation of privacy in her 
SNS posts by requiring that an employer show how his legitimate business 
interests are damaged before making an adverse employment decision.  Otherwise, 
it is foreseeable that there will be an increase in litigation that forces courts to 
change their position on SNS profiles, or legislatures will do it for the courts 
instead. 
